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CRIMINOLOGY AND BEHAVIORISM
Rustem Vambery
It was Rafaele Garofalo, nicknamed
by Lacassagne the "reasonable anthro-
pologist," who first pointed to the legal
definition of crime as a fundamental
difficulty in criminological research.
His suggestion, however, to substitute
for the legal definition, the "natural
crime" may be a wishful thought and a
useful hint for the legislator, but un-
fortunately what he termed "natural
crime," an act which offends the aver-
age measure of pity and probity in a
community, does not necessarily coin-
cide with what law really considers a
crime.
The issue whether such thing as
natural crime and, indeed, natural law
exists, is certainly not a new one, but
has gained some momentum through
the widening of the gap between
American and European criminological
methods. In view of the lack of a
definite method it seems doubtful
whether we may speak of a recognized
method of research at all. At any rate
it is perhaps not inexact to say that in
the U. S. the case study of crime seems
to prevail whereas in the European
etiological research the statistical meth-
od predominates. This divergence may
be partly due to the more recent
development of Judicial Statistics in
thi4 country whilst in France for exam-
ple, since more than a century, most
I Lecturer on Criminology, New York School
for Social Research. Formerly Professor of
elaborate crirn'e statistics were avail-
able.
Whatever the reason is, the fact
remains that various attempts have
been made to bridge over the incon-
gruence of the legal concept of crime
and its explanation as a social and
psychic phenomenon. All these attempts
revert in one way or the other to
bygone ages when the frontier between
law and other rules of social conduct
were blurred and indistinct. It took a
long time to clarify the line that divides
legal and moral rules. Hugo De Groot
by his memorable remark: "intelligi
jus naturale potest, etsi fingatur Deus
non esse"-has laid down the founda-
tions of a natural law irrespective of
the close connection between religious
and legal rules in past centuries. Legal
philosophers of the "century of en-
lightenment," like Thomasius, stressed
the difference between law and ethics
or, misinterpreting Kant's "Legalitaet
und Moralitaet," insisted on the separa-
tion and even on the contrast of the
two sets of rules.
,This general tendency found a par-
ticularly eager response both in the
theory and practice of criminal law
which since Voltaire and Beccaria stood
under the influence of the reaction to
the arbitrariness of bygone centuries.
However, as Professor Roscoe Pound
explained,2 "we are not so sure of this
Criminology in the University of Budapest.
2 Lrw and Morals, 2nd ed. 70.
[ 158]
CRIMINOLOGY AND BEHAVIORISM
opposition of law and morals with
respect to application as we were in
the 19th century .... Today the rise
of administrative tribunals and the
growing tendency to commit subjects
to them that were once committed to
the court, bears witness to the demand
for individualized application at many
new points. It will not do to say that
our regime of administrative justice is
not part of the law." How little the
progress may be which in the relation
of law to morals since the Greek
philosophers of the fifth century B. C.
has been made, it cannot be ignored
that the attempts nevertheless arrived
at some practical result.
Legal, like other rules of social con-
duct, are supposed to control human
behavior. Law, however, is insofar
different from other normative rules
that being a self restraint of the
supreme power in a human community,
it offers some guaranty against the
abuse of this power. If, as the so-called
"totalitarian" theory assumes, life,
liberty and property of the citizen were
at the mercy of the omnipotent state,
law would lose its raison d'etre. As it
lacked, indeed, its essential value dur-
ing all those centuries when the indi-
vidual was the defenseless victim of the
state or government despotism. One of
the moving forces of the French Revo-
lution was the system of the lettres de
cachet, blank warrants by which
courtiers could have "undesirable" ele-
ments imprisoned for an indefinite term.
In revolt against this arbitrary use
of judicial authority in pursuance of
interests, dislikes or revenge by those
' Yale L. J. 1937, 165.
in charge, of the government, the
Declaration of the Rights of Man, on
August 26, 1789, proclaimed that no
one must be punished but by virtue of
a law established and promulgated
prior to the perpetration of the crime.
Until recently, on the European con-
tinent, the legal adage nullum crimen
sine lege was the foundation of the
Penal Code and the Code was, indeed,
the Magna Charta not only, as Prof. v.
Liszt has put it, of the criminal, but
moreover of the lawabiding citizen.
Current revolutionary movements di-
rected against liberal democracy gave
up consciously this first defense line of
civil liberty. In contrast to the Penal
Code of 1871 the German Law of June
28, 1935, pronounced that, "Any person
who commits an act which the law
declares to be punishable or which is
deserving of penalty according to the
fundamental conceptions of a penal law
and a sound popular feeling, should be
punished." This "law," in fact itself a
promulgation of the dictators will, is a
logical sequence to the revolutionary
dictatorship. It implies that any act
may become a crime provided the
Court by way of analogy expresses the
"6ound" popular feeling that it should
be punished. Professor Hall, in his
valuable paper on the above quoted
adage,' reminds us how much-the Ger-
man law of 1935 resembles the Con-
stitutio Criminalis Theresiana (the
Penal Code of the Austrian Empress
Maria Theresa), declaring that, "cases
not set forth in the Code should be
decided according to the principles laid
down in the Code." It seems, however,
that the recent German law, by refer-
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ing to the "sound popular feeling"
which depends on a merely subjective
valuation, leaves a larger scope for
arbitrariness than the analogy based on
objective rules of the Austrian Code.
In view of current European events
the importance of the legal aspect of
crime has undoubtedly increased. Even
the all-powerful State, indeed, as Pro-
fessor Hall stresses, "especially the
all-powerful state, must use the regular
channels of due process before any
individual can be punished." In a
revolution legal rules prove as a de-
fense line apparently no more impene-
trable than the Maginot line did. But
this is exactly the reason why in con-
stitutional countries increased impor-
tance should be attached to guaranties
of personal liberty. Any endeavor,
therefore, to dim or blur the frontier
between the legal concept of crime and
other more or less vaguely defined
rules of conduct has to be energetically
rejected. Little it matters that a revo-
lution terms itself euphemistically a
"totalitarian" form of government, no
matter that revolution clads its pro-
munciamento-s in the traditional legal
form.
Revolution and law are incompatible.
What Carlyle wrote is still true: "Revo-
lution, like jelly sufficiently boiled,
needs only to be poured into shapes of
the constitution and consolidated there-
in-could it indeed contrive to cool."
Since this country thus far was for-
tunate enough to escape the current
dangers of war and revolution it is her
duty for self-preservation to keep
watch over the valuable ideological
guaranties of civil liberty.
I had to enlarge upon the nullum
crimen sine lege principle in order to
expound why, in my view, it would be
dangerous to give a vague crime con-
cept, to which law has closed its gates,
an entrance by the backdoor of crim-
inology. Professor Robert H. Gault is,
no doubt, right that to haggle over
definitions at the outset is to invite
stagnation even with regard to the term
"crime." "Crime is both a social and
individual phenomenon." Certainly, but
nonetheless it is a legal phenomenon,
too, and to ignore the legal aspect of
crime is to invite confusion in the
etiology of crime as a social and indi-
vidual phenomenon. Not only the
majority of American criminologists
but the most prominent ones are not
jurists. They are as a rule, sociologists
or psychiatrists. This might account
for their underrating of the legal
definition of crime and the endeavor to
facilitate the research work by substi-
tuting a social concept to the legal con-
cept of crime.
Such an endeavor becomes manifest
in quite a number of recent textbooks.
May I quote one for many, the valuable
"Criminal Behavior" by Professor
Walter C. Reckless who, following
Professor Thorsten Sellin's attempt "to
escape the superficial legalistic defini-
tion" declares: "While criminologists
have studied primarily the infractions
of the criminal code of modern states
and hence have traditionally narrowed
their field of investigation to illegal
behavior, crime, sociologically speak-
ing, is fundamentally a violation of
conduct norms which contain sanctions,
no matter whether found in the crim-
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inal law of the modern state or merely
in the working rules of special groups."
There is, however, a profound differ-
ence between the norms of criminal
law and the working rules of special
social groups: the definiteness of the
first and the indefiniteness of the latter.
To obscure this difference seems to
invite danger from both the constitu-
tional and the criminological viewpoint.
Sharp and severe sanctions may im-
pel the observation of the moral and
professional rules of a social group.
Various reasons account, however, for
not having made the transgression of
these rules a crime as the legislator has
done in other cases where moral and
legal rules, indeed, coincide. Charity
is a moral precept, but it would be
impossible to determine by law when
the violation of this rule should become
liable to punishment. A certain vague-
ness of moral rules seems desirable, but
the vagueness of the legal definition is
inconsistent with the guaranty which
law is supposed to offer to personal
liberty. Removing these guaranties in
an epoch in which champions of violence
d&n'naie a conziderable part of the
world means a support to those who
would undermine the very existence of
law. Even Lothrop Stoddard who is
certainly not biased against the ideo-
logical foundations of the Third Reich
adi.-dts in his recent book4 that no safe-
guaxds exist under this system for the
individual citizen.
I do not feel competent to test the
statements of Mr. Raymond Moley'
but what we learn about the close rela-
4 Into the Darkness, 1940, p. 270.
tion of criminal justice and politics,
about politics "embodied in the prose-
cutor administering the criminal law,
for its own objectives and its own
image," makes it even in a true democ-
racy as the U. S. all the more important
to adhere resolutely to the strict legal
concept of crime. Though this adher-
ence may be no safeguard against the
political abuse of criminal justice yet
the obliteration of the frontiers between
crime and not-crime not only facilitates
such misuse but increases the indiffer-
ence of the public to law as a guaranty
of civil liberties.
However, it remains doubtful whether
the sacrifice of the legal concept of
crime made even only with regard to
criminology would be, indeed, helpful
to criminological research. If we stick
to -:nhat is bing derided "the legalistic
vein of thought" and limit research by
the legal concept of crime the research
work is facing unquestionable difficul-
ties. Its scope may, indeed, prove
partly too narrow, but on the other
hand it may prove partly too broad.
Assuming that prevention of crime is
the ultimate objective of criminological
research the etiology of murder or
burglary is probably of greater practi-
cal interest than the research into the
violation of traffic laws though both are
crimes in the legal sense of the term.
t enlains quctionLk, L. .er, that
by extending the range of research to
the violation of non-legal rules of social
conduct, this means by broadening the
scope of criminology instead of restrict-
ing it the incongruity of acts, labelled
5 Politics and Criminal Prosecution, New York,
1929.
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crime by the law, would be really
eliminated.
Anyone, brought up in European
jurisprudence, cannot easily compre-
hend Professor Sutherland's subtle
argument that "crime and not-crime
are not very distinct types of behavior,
but constitute a continuum" because
"the status of the wrongdoer and the
attitudes of the influential part of the
public toward his actions are highly
important in determining whether his
actions are or are not crimes."' Are
we to understand that in the great
American Democracy the "influential
part of the public" determines, regard-
less of the law, whether the act of
the defendant is a crime or not, and
are laws, indeed, merely outlets of pub-
lic emotion as Professor Park, quoted
by Professor Sutherland, wants us to
believe? However this may be, it is
hard to be in harmony with Professor
Sutherland's conclusion that "in gen-
eral the criminal law is not imple-
mented to punish the somewhat subtle
kinds of fraud." No matter whether
this regrettable fact is due to the in-
comprehensibly faulty wording of the
law or to the unwillingness of the legis-
lator to penalize the "subtle kinds of
fraud" the result is the same i.e., that
these unpunished frauds are no crimes
of fraud unless we are prepared to re-
turn to "natural" law discriminating
malum in se and malum prohibitum.
Quite so, but Professor Sutherland
further implies that the view "we
would have no crime if we had no
laws . . . is logomachy because the
6 Principles of Criminology, 3d ed. 18.
behavior would remain essentially the
same. "I am not so sure about this.
Without overrating the value of the
penal sanction its lack, too, may have
some effect on behavior. In Professor
Sutherland's view "Stealing would not
in a legal sense be a crime but it
would still be stealing and the public
would react to it by public disgrace."
Not even this reaction is necessarily
presumable as it appears from the
medieval German adage: "Rauben und
stehlen ist keine Schande, das thun
die Besten im Lande. "May be public
opinion nowadays would be less leni-
ent in the moral valuation of robbery
and larceny yet it can be scarcely said,
without risking hypocrisy, that boot-
legging if it ever was is still a disgrace
after the repeal of the Liquor Prohi-
bition Amendment. No evidence is
needed to prove that the rules of crim-
inal law do not always coincide with
other norms of social conduct. For
arguments sake let us assume, how-
ever, that the nondescript crimes would
brovoke the same resentment and cen-
sure as crimes-in a legal sense-do,
and disregarding the aspect of personal
liberty let us agree to the conclusion
that "crime and not-crime are not two
distinct types of behavior."
From the watch-tower of 'behavior-
ism, a belated child of the material-
istic philosophy, this argument is un-
assailable. Without challenging the
value of the behaviorist doctrine, as an
American contribution to our scanty
knowledge of psychology, to which no
less man than John Dewey has turned7
I The Philosophy of J. D. by P. R. Schilpp,
1939, p. 33.
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its generalisations are not necessarily
helpful to criminological research. Not
only because of the instability of be-
haviorism the Watsonian ideal of
which, according to Horace M. Kallen,
"is in the air and a shift in the ruling
doctrine whether in Russia or in the
U. S., may give behaviorism over to
the same fate that befell association-
ism." Not only because thus far all
attempts to pigeonhole manifestations
of the human personality in its rela-
tion to social environment into formu-
lae of natural science have not con-
tributed much to a better understand-
ing of the etiology of crime. There is a
further reason dissuading the substi-
tution of criminal behavior to crime.
The behavior system, as we are told,
is more than an aggregation of indi-
vidual crimes. In this respect it re-
sembles somehow professional crime
which in its legal definitions by recent
European laws presupposes a unity of
determination to make of crime a liv-
ing. However, there is a difference,
too. It is the law the rules of which
decide whether a number of criminal
acts constitutes professional crime or
not. Nothing short of a judgment of
the competent Court is to decide
whether an act is part of a legal unit
which at the same time is a socio-
logical unit, too.
Fully admitting the soundness of
the fundamental idea that in order to
make progress in the explanation of
crime not the legal label should matter
and as Professor Sutherland wrote:
"it is desirable to break crime into
more homogeneous units." Very well,
but as "a sociological unit need not be
confined to the legal prescriptions,
"who is to delimit the subject matter
of criminological study? Thus far no
suggestion has been made except that
the criminologist can define his own
units and does not need to accept the
decision of courts and legislatures.
This is, no doubt, a very convenient
method. The criminologist may easier
find an explanation if he depends
merely on his own judgment as to de-
termine what amounts to criminal be-
havior. But the method has its draw-
backs nonetheless. First of all where
is the criminologist going to get his
facts which are reliable enough to con-
clude herefrom a criminal behavior? If
we assume the establishment of a
criminological Dies Committee, investi-
gating such criminal activities which
are no crimes, I don't think its declara-
tion that someone's behavior is crim-
inal would represent the spirit of the
American Constitution and of its heart,
the Bill of Rights.
Apart from this reflection it cannot
be ignored that criminology is inter-
ested in the etiology of crime and in
the psychology of the criminal. These
are legal concepts, no matter how dif-
ferent the social manifestations covered
by the same legal label, might be. I
need not enlarge upon the reason why
and how various social precepts dif-
ferentiated, but the fact remains that
they are different from each other in
many ways. Not only the sanctions at-
tached to them are different, but partly
the rules themselves. The violation of
a criminal law is not necessarily a
transgression of an other "conduct
norm" of a social group and vice
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versa. If criminology aims at exercis-
ing an intentional influence on a more
reasonable use of criminal law and
punishment as effective weapons in
struggle against crime, as it does, it
cannot draw its conclusions from a re-
search based on human behavior which
becomes manifest in non-crimes strongly
disapproved though they may be by any
other normative group but the State.
A behavior system, according to Pro-
fessor Sutherland, "should be defined
as a way of life . . . similar to a dis-
ease which is differentiated from other
diseases by the causal, process com-
mon to it regardless of the person in
whom it occurs." I think the simile is
not very fortunate. Since Virchow we
know that a disease cannot be consid-
ered as a causal process regardless of
the patient, but moreover if in investi-
gating behavior sequences we do not
discriminate between crimes and non-
crimes this would amount to studying
typhoid by taking into consideration
paratyphoid cases, too, which in many
of its symptoms resembles the typhoid
fever.
Although it would be certainly con-
venient if in criminological research
we would not need "to know positively
the specific causation of crime," the
substitution of the research relating to
behavior to the etiological study of
crime is neither unobjectionable nor
entirely satisfactory. Not merely be-
cause all crimes do not fit into behav-
ior systems for, as the most prominent
advocate of the system Professor Suth-
erland admits, "certain crimes stand
somewhat isolated and outside of sys-
tems," but because of its arbitrariness
in selecting the subject matter of re-
search work. However, it has its un-
deniable merits as well. Certainly no
objection can be raised against substi-
tuting behavior for crime in the case
of juvenile delinquency, at least not in
countries where the Children's Court is
supposed to deal with the personality
of the delinquent of which the crime
is but one of several indications. Dean
Kirchwey significantly termed the pro-
cedure of the Juvenile Court as based
on the principles of equity jurisdiction.
In establishing Children or Juvenile
Courts the law in most countries made
allowance for the presumption that ju-
venile delinquents are less likely to
be victims of that arbitrariness against
which the principle nullum crimen sine
lege wants -to protect the citizen. In-
vestigations of criminal careers in the
masterful studies of Professor Sheldon
and Eleanor Glueck supply sufficient
evidence of fairly reliable results with-
out reducing the individualities to be-
havior patterns.
By pointing to the dangers which the
merging of the etiology of crime with
criminal behaviorism imply do not
want to minimize the shortcomings of
the present methods of criminology. The
general label "crime" or as for that
the legal labels of specific crimes cover
various kinds of behavior. Whilst the
law discriminates according to the
gravity of the act it ignores the pos-
sible sociological diversities in which
criminology is mainly interested. How-
ever, the correlation between crime
as a legal, a sociological and a psycho-
logical phenomenon is undeniable.
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When criminology is aiming at the etio-
logical explanation of crime as a mani-
festation of the individual it must not
disregard the legal aspect of the social
and psychic phenomenon either. It
would be a misconception of reality if
we ignored that the etiology of murder
or arson, on account of its greater
dangerousness, rouses more interest
than the violation of traffic regulations.
Therefore in attempting to improve the
methods of criminological research it
would be more promising to restrict the
research work to certain kinds of crime
the social and individual background
of which is presumably similar and
permanent in certain areas.
I am afraid it is a current mistake
to presume that a distinctly outlined
legal definition of crime, or rather of
crimes, is a bar to an adequate deal-
ing with crime as a social phenomenon.
Various recent penal codes as for in-
stance the new Swiss Federal Code or
the ingenious Draft Criminal Code for
Cuba by Dr. Fernando Ortiz (Proyecto
de Codigo Criminal Cubano, 1926)
furnish ample evidence that the re-
sults of criminology can be adequately
utilized within the frame of the law.
In a reverse manner the "legalistic
vein" or rather the reluctance to re-
turn to medieval witch-hunting is likely
to prove a less insurmountable obsta-
cle on the way of criminological re-
search than the still obvious lack of
a research method which could har-
monize the study of crime as a mass
phenomenon and the case study of the
individual criminal. And before all let
us give up the enticing illusion that
the study of crime and criminals could
ever produce exact results such as ar-
rived at in natural science. If we re-
nounce these unattainable certainties
we shall much more appreciate the
probabilities which criminology thus
far offers.
Essence of Practical Criminology:
"Whatever theories one may hold about the general causes of criminalism or
whatever the measures that may be undertaken to combat deteriorating eco-
nomic or envirbnmental conditions, alcoholism, or the inheritance of defect, it
must not be forgotten that it will always remain for the courts to deal with the
individual as such and, if he is convicted of crime, for other public officials to
administer subsequent treatment to him as a human individual. It follows, then,
that whatever methods of study will aid toward understanding what is best to
be done for given offenders will prove to be the essence of a practical, applied
criminology. The crux of the problem may be stated as not what 'the criminal'
in general is, but rather what has brought about this given individual offender's
career. To this concrete knowledge there is no royal road."--William Healy:
"The Problem of Causation of Criminality."
It seems to me significant that the two outstanding achievements of American
criminal justice-the juvenile court and PROBATION-have to do primarily
with preventive justice-with individualization.-Roscoe Pound.
